ABSTRACT
This clearly states the policy violation constraint, but does not consider whether the communication channel was envisaged as a communication channel by the system designer. A where channel comprises of both covert and overt negotiated by the covert users and s uses intricate encoding schemes. These schemes may be proliferated into multiple protocols, where each such protocol will be a trapdoor. This makes it [18] makes uses of multi-trapdoor or ameliorated development of covert channel. A hybrid covert channel scenario may .Implementation of erent covert channel variants at the same instance of time tends to behave as a single . A Hybrid Covert el variants existing at same instance of time. Hybrid covert channel may not have strict composition. It becomes complicated An instance of the hybrid covert channel
The covert channel was first introduced in the traditional confinement problem as described in Extensive work is carried out in devising the detection methods which can be on real-time or nsics [6] based. Scenario based analysis of the covert channel detections [3] [7] is performed to understand the detection better. Monitoring the unusual traffic [14] in the network stream is a s as Poisson's distribution is also a way to detect such activity. Illegitimate information flows can be tracked through Sequence Charts (MSC) [9] .This paper employs a statistical protocol based to detect hybrid covert channel based on analysis made on packet headers.
2.COVERT COMMUNICATION
In Network communication, covert communication amongst a pair of users can take two forms; (a) covert data exchange and (b) covert indication
In covert data exchange, covert data is excha in rudimentary protocols. This form of covert communication can best be understood with pipeline problem, where there exists two pipesp inside the other such that d 2 < d 1 transportation of crude oil. In Figure 3 , the inner pipe p known or undocumented in the design and used for smuggling oil. The outer pipe p legitimate pipe. This type of the covert communication type will not have pre schemes will be simple placement of covert data (trapdoor creation) directly in to the identi clandestine field in the traditional network protocol network covert channel.
Second form of covert communication is the covert indication. Covert users communicate in a language not known to others. In Figure 4 , the covert s encoding scheme to leak information. This information encoding scheme as seen from the figure 1 is the language that covert users employ to communicate in a secured legitimate network environment. This sophisticated decoding the language might be quite difficult in many situations.
The best real time classical example of such commu leaks the answers to Student Y for an presence of invigilating officer. For each choice in a question, student X makes a gestur triggers an event to student Y. For instance to communicate choice A to student Y, student X coughs. Same schema holds good continuous clock events that communicate some form of action to be performed by covert user Y.Some of the other forms of covert indication in network scenario Second form of covert communication is the covert indication. Covert users communicate in a language not known to others. In Figure 4 , the covert sender and receiver share an information encoding scheme to leak information. This information encoding scheme as seen from the figure 1 is the language that covert users employ to communicate in a secured legitimate network environment. This sophisticated communication is visible to our detection engine; decoding the language might be quite difficult in many situations.
The best real time classical example of such communication is Examination Problem leaks the answers to Student Y for an objective type examination paper in an examination hal cer. For each choice in a question, student X makes a gestur dent Y. For instance to communicate choice A to student Y, student X good in case network communication where covert user X triggers continuous clock events that communicate some form of action to be performed by covert user Y.Some of the other forms of covert indication in network scenario include nged between the covert users by hiding covert data in rudimentary protocols. This form of covert communication can best be understood with respectively, one . These pipes are setup between two geographical places for the is the covert pipe not known or undocumented in the design and used for smuggling oil. The outer pipe p 1 is the ned encoding schemes will be simple placement of covert data (trapdoor creation) directly in to the identified stack. This channel is called as simple Second form of covert communication is the covert indication. Covert users communicate in a ender and receiver share an information encoding scheme to leak information. This information encoding scheme as seen from the figure 1 is the language that covert users employ to communicate in a secured legitimate network engine; however nication is Examination Problem. Student X objective type examination paper in an examination hall in cer. For each choice in a question, student X makes a gesture that dent Y. For instance to communicate choice A to student Y, student X in case network communication where covert user X triggers continuous clock events that communicate some form of action to be performed by covert user
• Encoding ASCII character set in Sequence number. Decoding the same by applying mathematical operation on sequence number. This can either be in TCP or In IP ID fields.
• Repeated sending of acknowledge packet to is listening to. Receiver has to count the number of time the acknowledge packet was sent to this server. This value can later on mapped to ASCII table for retrieving suitable character.
• Retrieving the packet so information to the covert receiver.
• Using logical operators like the XOR with sequence number to get the covert data. • Storage Covert Channel indirectly read or writes in to storage location. R/W in hard disk.
3.COVERT CHANNEL VARIANTS
• Timing Covert Channel modulating the resources in such a way that real response time is observed by the receiver.
• Retrieving the packet sorting order numbering in IPSec frames which serves as information to the covert receiver. Using logical operators like the XOR with sequence number to get the covert data.
ARIANTS
Covert channel are categorized based on different aspects of the overall entities involved in the shared resources, backdoor/trapdoor placement and parties . The covert channel general classification is given belowNoisy Covert Channel [14] is a communication channel which has presence of and covert users. Noiseless Covert Channel [14] is the communication channel used solely by covert Storage Covert Channel [14] involves the sender and the receiver either directly or writes in to storage location. The implementation can be on file Timing Covert Channel [14] [13] involves the sender signalling the information by modulating the resources in such a way that real response time is observed by the Simple Network Covert Channel [14] (SNCC) exists by creating a trapdoor in rudimentary protocols used in network protocol suite. Steganographic Channel [3] is a means of communication where sender and receiver collude to prevent an observer being able to reliably detect whether communication is happening.
[15]-is a covert channel in a cryptographic algorithm, typically proved undetectable. Supraliminal Channel [12] -A supraliminal channel encodes information in the content of cover data, generating innocent communication in a manner similar to mimic functions.
Encoding ASCII character set in Sequence number. Decoding the same by applying mathematical operation on sequence number. This can either be in TCP or In IP ID fields.
an unknown server where the covert receiver is listening to. Receiver has to count the number of time the acknowledge packet was sent to this server. This value can later on mapped to ASCII table for retrieving suitable rting order numbering in IPSec frames which serves as Using logical operators like the XOR with sequence number to get the covert data.
s of the overall entities involved in the parties involved in on channel which has presence of is the communication channel used solely by covert involves the sender and the receiver either directly or implementation can be on file-lock, involves the sender signalling the information by modulating the resources in such a way that real response time is observed by the [14] (SNCC) exists by creating a trapdoor in [3] is a means of communication where sender and g able to reliably detect whether is a covert channel in a cryptographic algorithm,
A supraliminal channel encodes information in the content of cover data, generating innocent communication in a manner
• Hybrid Covert Channel covert channels existing at same instance of time. The composition of the Hybr covert channel is difficult to assess from third party which is trying to detect. Mixed composition of covert channel variants behave as single coherent covert channel and is of a greatest threat to the legitimate network environment. For instance noisy covert channel in transport layer with subliminal channel in network layer or application layer.
4.ATTACK MODELLING
The attack modelling [4] can be based on different scenarios and placement covert users. Each of these scenarios are designed and built t in direct or encoded format; direct communication is merely placement of covert data over an clandestine medium in the network protocol. Alternatively the covert user can communicate using encoding scheme and that is known only to the covert users.
The intricate design, choosing of clandestine mediums (trapdoors) and encoding scheme paves a way for successful undetectable mediums may be difficult and hence detection metric called covertness index is used. is given below and will be used for assessment in the attack scenarios.
This important formation scenarios of covert channels where attack can be devised .
4.1Scenario -1
The attack scenarios have three entities and Eve is legitimate entity/user. The scenario comprises of the combination of covert and legitimate users hence it is scenario of noisy Bob and Eve is legitimate channel comprising of covert channel and between Alice and Eve is covert channel. Alice and Bob have pre information and is mentioned in dotted lines in the figure 5. Hybrid Covert Channel [4] is co-existence of two or more different variants of covert channels existing at same instance of time. The composition of the Hybr covert channel is difficult to assess from third party which is trying to detect. Mixed composition of covert channel variants behave as single coherent covert channel and is of a greatest threat to the legitimate network environment. For covert channel in transport layer with subliminal channel in network layer or application layer.
The attack modelling [4] can be based on different scenarios and placement covert users. Each of these scenarios are designed and built to fulfil certain objectives. Covert users can communicate in direct or encoded format; direct communication is merely placement of covert data over an clandestine medium in the network protocol. Alternatively the covert user can communicate g scheme and that is known only to the covert users.
The intricate design, choosing of clandestine mediums (trapdoors) and encoding scheme paves a way for successful undetectable establishment of covert channel. Detecting such strong covert be difficult and hence detection metric called covertness index is used. is given below and will be used for assessment in the attack scenarios.
scenarios of covert channels where attack can be devised is given below The attack scenarios have three entities -Alice, Bob and Eve; Alice and Bob are covert attackers and Eve is legitimate entity/user. The scenario comprises of the combination of covert and legitimate users hence it is scenario of noisy covert channel. The channel established between Bob and Eve is legitimate channel comprising of covert channel and between Alice and Eve is covert channel. Alice and Bob have pre-established channel to communicate the attack n dotted lines in the figure 5. where P(T) = Probability ofa trapdoor card (Ut) = Universal set of all possibletrapdoors
The covertness index for subliminal channel in IPSec
IPSec make use of AES-XCBC implantation -Sequence Number field and padding. The maximum number of rounds in AES random number generator algorithm is 16. Out of seed.
As per [7] the trapdoors can be detected under the assumption stated in the hybrid covert channel formation. However this will not be the same if multiple trapdoors are set in each of the protocol headers. 
Scenario-2
This scenario is built on the threat m users in sub-network are compromised. This sub communication from the sub network to all the other networks is built using a Hybrid Covert Channel. This sub network can be similar to bot The scenario can have multi-trapdoor or protocol hopped hybrid covert channel [16] . The trapdoor can move from one protocol or can be combination trapdoors in multiple level in the protocol suite. Hence there can be no particular index.
5.COVERT SCHEMES AND THEIR EMB
The covert schemes are crucial for conveying th obscured way. More sophisticated scheme likely not to be retrieved by detection entity. Few samples of covert schemes were discussed in section 2 of this paper and detailed schemes are presented here.
Scheme 1
The IP ID is field used for identification of the packet and is used for the routing purpose. The covert scheme used for this field is based on following strategy
• Intentional use of only certain IP ID's while having conversation with Covert receiver.
• Scheme is designed by the covert sender for embedding covert characters in to the IP ID field.
• The Covert receiver applies the scheme used by the sender to retrieve the covert character.
For instance a simple scheme that can be used for this field is extrac performing modulus operation of the character set size. General notation for this scheme for encoding a character 'c' is This scenario is built on the threat model of noiseless covert channel, where the resources and network are compromised. This sub-network is connected to other network. The communication from the sub network to all the other networks is built using a Hybrid Covert b network can be similar to bot-net as described in [8] . 
CHEMES AND THEIR EMBODIMENT
The covert schemes are crucial for conveying the covert data over communication channel in a obscured way. More sophisticated scheme likely not to be retrieved by detection entity. Few samples of covert schemes were discussed in section 2 of this paper and detailed schemes are
The IP ID is field used for identification of the packet and is used for the routing purpose. The covert scheme used for this field is based on following strategyIntentional use of only certain IP ID's while having conversation with Covert receiver. heme is designed by the covert sender for embedding covert characters in to the IP ID Intentional use of only certain IP ID's while having conversation with Covert receiver. heme is designed by the covert sender for embedding covert characters in to the IP ID The Covert receiver applies the scheme used by the sender to retrieve the covert ting the IP ID is by performing modulus operation of the character set size. General notation for this scheme for To convey a covert message, the covert sender has select IP ID in such a way as to match with ‫.)ܿ(ܧ‬
Scheme 2
Another prominent scheme used is on the sequence number where maximum range is 4,294,967,296 numbers as it is 32 bit field. To communicate covertly under this scheme following strategy is employed-
• Sequence number is multiplied with value of character set and bound is declared with maximum limit.
• The receiver side retrieves the sequence number and then divides it by character set size. The encoding function ‫)ܿ(ܧ‬ is given belowWhere S is the initial sequence number and n is the size of the character set. The decoding function is ‫)'ܿ(ܦ‬ is given belowWhere ܿ' is the decoded character and ܵ' is the received sequence number.
For instance to send a character `I' covertly over the channel, the sender would have to choose 1235037038 as sequence number and the max. value is derived as 65535 * 256 = 16777216
Therefore the decoded character is ‫)'ܿ(ܦ‬ = 1235037038=16777216 = 73, The value 73 when mapped back to ASCII Table is the character `I'.
Scheme 3
Another scheme which has tremendous effect on the bandwidth is the modulation of TCP timestamps or use of timing element in the network protocol. TCP timestamps is in the options field of the TCP header which indicates the round trip time of the packets. The TCP process accurately calculates the next retransmission of TCP segment which was failed to be acknowledged. If the character is to be covertly sent using this scheme following strategy is used.
• Get the binary representation of the character and extract bits from the least significant bit.
• Check if the Timestamp least significant bit (LSB) is same as covert bit, if so send the TCP segment.
• Covert receiver will extract the LSB of the timestamp and store the same until it is a byte.
Let ‫ܿܤ‬be the binary representation of the character `c' and F LSB (B c ) be the encoding function for encoding the covert bits in TCP timestamp.
6.ENTROPY BASED COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS
The entropy [2] in communication network indicates the number of bits required to encode a character over the channel as stated by Shannon Entropy theory. This is based on the frequency of the characters in given string and the size of the alphabet. The entropy measure also checks for uncertainty of the random variable.
Let A be finite set of characters such that |ܵ| ≥ 1 and any character`ܿ' ∈ ‫.ܣ‬ A is sequence of symbols which is a string, each of alphabet in string ∈ A. For instance let cbbacabbac be sequence of symbols that needs to be transmitted over network then its sequence of bits represents the coded symbol sequence which may be 101110011011100010. Then the entropy for such scenario is defined aswhere݅ ∈ |ܵ| and |ܵ| > 1, pi is the probability of the occurrence of symbol 'c' in the string and n gives the length of the string. To transmit a message "network" over the communication network, following are the calculated entropy for each alphabetThe frequency of all the characters in a string with unique symbols will be same, since the word "network" has unique symbols the frequency is 0.143. Let X be string for which the entropy is to be calculated, here X may word like network or stream of numbers then In a covert channel scenario, the covert user has to be chosen the message in such a way that the entropy of string should always be less that number of bits available for that field in the protocol header.
i.e.,H(X)<|Maximumnumberofbitsinthatfield(B f )|
The IP ID presented in the scheme 1 of this paper has 16 bits in the IP header, so to send X the minimum of 21 bits are required. Hence capacity of the covert channel is
The covert channel occupies 25% of total IP header s header or protocol header simply doubles the covert channel capacity. However the entropy to channel capacity ratio will be low thus making it robust ie., This makes the detection of covert bits much difficult fields for analysis.
In general, for robust covert channel construction where covert channel will be greater than 0.5. The multiple trapdoors through a protoc protocols is actually setting up of multiple covert channels in the communication network. The entropy for such scenarios is dispersed across multiple making it difficult to understand the scheme. Also in the scenario of multi hybrid covert channel where the effect of the entropy is doubled. The below results shown in the figure 7 and figure 8 shows the accurate expected behaviour discussed in this paper The IP ID presented in the scheme 1 of this paper has 16 bits in the IP header, so to send X the minimum of 21 bits are required. Hence capacity of the covert channel is
The covert channel occupies 25% of total IP header space. Multiple trapdoors (t) [5] [4] in IP header or protocol header simply doubles the covert channel capacity. However the entropy to channel capacity ratio will be low thus making it robust ie., This makes the detection of covert bits much difficult as the detection systems needs to scan more for robust covert channel construction where ߟ [7] the covertness index for such multi covert channel will be greater than 0.5. The multiple trapdoors through a protoc protocols is actually setting up of multiple covert channels in the communication network. The entropy for such scenarios is dispersed across multiple making it difficult to understand the scheme. Also in the scenario of multi-trapdoors covert channel behaves like a single coherent hybrid covert channel where the effect of the entropy is doubled. The below results shown in the figure 7 and figure 8 shows the accurate expected behaviour discussed in this paper - The IP ID presented in the scheme 1 of this paper has 16 bits in the IP header, so to send X the minimum of 21 bits are required. Hence capacity of the covert channel is pace. Multiple trapdoors (t) [5] [4] in IP header or protocol header simply doubles the covert channel capacity. However the entropy to as the detection systems needs to scan more [7] the covertness index for such multi-trapdoor covert channel will be greater than 0.5. The multiple trapdoors through a protocol or set of protocols is actually setting up of multiple covert channels in the communication network. The entropy for such scenarios is dispersed across multiple making it difficult to understand the channel behaves like a single coherent hybrid covert channel where the effect of the entropy is doubled. The below results shown in the -
The results indicate the multiple trapdoors used in hybrid covert channel yields to a higher entropy value and low channel to entropy ratio (C/E). The constant C/E ratio also indicates the consistent usage of protocol header for constructing multi-trapdoor based hybrid covert channel. This implies that the covert schemes used in Hybrid covert channel is difficult detect in secured communication.
7.RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The number of trapdoors implemented in a protocol cannot be all the fields vulnerable in that protocol. i.e., where T m is the max number of trapdoors possible in that protocol T s is the no. of Trapdoors set. The graph of Trapdoors Vs the Covertness Index is show in the figure 9 where increase in the number of the trapdoors in IPv4 increases the difficulty in detecting the covert channel. The trapdoor setting in IPSec using subliminal channel is slightly complex to understand. However the ESP format provides two fields to convey the covert bits in the protocol header. The remaining data is sent over the ESP algorithm during the time of the key generation for encryption using AES algorithm. The residual bits in used in random number generation or used in the round box of the AES and this is depicted on row 2 of the table 2. Hence the covertness index is 0.15 * equation 2 which is 0.47. This will not change any further as there is limited scope for subliminal channel development in IPSec -ESP format. The table 3 depicts the changing trapdoor that has an effect on the covertness index. When more number of the trapdoors are involved it is difficult to detect the composition of the covert cha shows change in the trapdoor count that has an effect in the detection. However the changes in the covertness index can be minimal. The trapdoor setting in the subliminal channel in SSL/TLS is based on the algorithm used in its cipher s However to increase the complexity of the subliminal to thwart detection the randomization of bits is feasible in chosen prime number. This forms Newton index for such channels is discussed in the table 4 The table 3 depicts the changing trapdoor that has an effect on the covertness index. When more number of the trapdoors are involved it is difficult to detect the composition of the covert channel. The figure 11 shows change in the trapdoor count that has an effect in the detection. However the changes in the covertness index can be minimal. The trapdoor setting in the subliminal channel in SSL/TLS is based on the algorithm used in its cipher suite. This is purely called as random oracle channel. However to increase the complexity of the subliminal to thwart detection the randomization of bits is feasible in chosen prime number. This forms Newton Subliminal Channel. The covertness channels is discussed in the The graph of Trapdoors Vs the Covertness Index is show in the figure 10 where increase in the number of the trapdoors in IPSec ESP makes covertness index constant. The trapdoors in TCP s simple and provides seven fields for placing the covert data. The table 3 depicts the changing trapdoor that has an effect on the covertness index. When more number of the nnel. The figure 11 shows change in the trapdoor count that has an effect in the detection. However the changes in the covertness index can be minimal. The trapdoor setting in the subliminal channel in SSL/TLS is uite. This is purely called as random oracle channel. However to increase the complexity of the subliminal to thwart detection the randomization of Subliminal Channel. The covertness C/E .14 .
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.35 The graph of covertness index Vs th 12. The higher entropy value for the some of the formation indicates that the detection engine [10] is able to detect the activity and this give clear indication of the higher detection rates. Hybrid Covert channel is not feasible for the combinations of the Network covert channel in TCP and IPv4 as this become easily detectable combination. The graph of covertness index Vs the trapdoor in the subliminal channel is shown in the figure  12 . The higher entropy value for the some of the formation indicates that the detection engine [10] is able to detect the activity and this give clear indication of the higher detection rates. rid Covert channel is not feasible for the combinations of the Network covert channel in TCP and IPv4 as this become easily detectable combination. .14 e trapdoor in the subliminal channel is shown in the figure 12. The higher entropy value for the some of the formation indicates that the detection engine [10] is able to detect the activity and this give clear indication of the higher detection rates. 
8.CONCLUSION
Covert schemes are difficult to understand from third party entity as they obscure the content taken in protocol header. This provides an opportunity for embedding any data which may even be malware code. Entropy based analysis gives the actual number of bits used to represent the covert symbol in a protocol. This gives clearly metric to understand the covert channel schemes in a better way. It is unacceptable to have malicious conversation of the network even in presence of administrator. It is inference this experiment that the hybri entropy which makes it difficult to detect. It is required to concentrate on stronger detection principle to detect such events.
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